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Abstract This article develops an account of local epistemic practices on the basis
of case studies from ethnobiology. I argue that current debates about objectivity often
stand in the way of a more adequate understanding of local knowledge and ethno-
biological practices in general. While local knowledge about the biological world
often meets criteria for objectivity in philosophy of science, general debates about the
objectivity of local knowledge can also obscure their unique epistemic features. In
modification of Ian Hacking’s suggestion to discuss “ground level questions” instead
of objectivity, I propose an account that focuses on both epistemic virtues and vices
of local epistemic practices.
Keywords Objectivity · Ethnobiology · Local knowledge · Indigenous knowledge ·
Standpoint theory
Philosophical debates about objectivity typically focus on scientific case studies and
pay relatively little attention to knowledge of local communities. Insofar as local
knowledge is considered at all in these debates, it is often contrasted with objective
knowledge. There are two common strategies of contrasting locality and objectivity.
On the one hand, the notion of objectivity can be used to challenge the epistemic status
of local knowledge. If objectivity requires universalizability, for example, genuinely
local knowledge cannot be objective. On the other hand, it has become common in
poststructuralist and postcolonial contexts to invert this contrast by using the notion of
locality to challenge philosophical accounts of objectivity. Academic discussions that
are explicitly concerned with “locality” often follow Foucault’s (2003, p. 9) strategy
B David Ludwig
davidundludwig@gmail.com; d.j.ludwig@vu.nl
1 Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
123
Synthese
“of playing local [...] knowledges off against the unitary theoretical instance that claims
to be able to filter them, organize them into a hierarchy, organize them in the name of
a true body of knowledge.“
This article will not follow either of these strategies but aim for a more nuanced
account of the intersection of debates about objectivity and local knowledge. Any
discussion with this aim faces the challenge that both “objectivity” and “local knowl-
edge” are hopelessly ambiguous terms. “Local knowledge” is typically used as an
umbrella term to engage with vastly different epistemic practices that are not institu-
tionalized as science. Instead of aiming at a general definition of “local knowledge”,
I will focus on current ethnobiological research on Indigenous knowledge about the
biological world. Of course, Indigenous knowledge is only a subset of local knowl-
edge and ethnobiology is only concerned with a subset of Indigenous knowledge. Still,
ethnobiology provides an excellent starting point for a discussion of local knowledge
that is informed by the details of empirical case studies.
Engaging with these case studies from ethnobiology leads to a complex picture
beyond the simple contrast between objectivity and locality. Indeed, local ethnobi-
ological knowledge satisfies many standard criteria for objectivity in philosophy of
science and can also be interpreted in the framework of standpoint theory as contribut-
ing to a “strong objectivity” (Harding 1995). However, I argue that general debates
about the objectivity of local knowledge obscure how knowledge systems come with
different epistemic virtues and vices. I therefore propose to move beyond the question
whether local knowledge is objective to a more detailed discussion of the epistemic
features of different knowledge systems.
My discussion will proceed in three steps. Section 1 starts with Hacking’s (2015)
suggestion to replace objectivity debates with more specific discussions of epistemic
vices. Pace Hacking, I argue that the suggestion fails in ethnobiological cases where
the validity of an entire knowledge system is questioned. Local knowledge systems
are often suspected to lack core virtues that are associated with objectivity and an
exclusive focus on epistemic vices therefore turns out to be a privilege. Section 2
addresses two virtues that are often associatedwith objectivity. I argue that both virtues
are common in local ethnobiological knowledge of Indigenous communities. Section
3 returns to Hacking’s proposal to substitute general objectivity talk with discussions
of more specific “ground level” questions. I argue that Hacking’s proposal becomes
convincing if we include both epistemic virtues and vices in a discussion of ground
level questions.
1 Objectivity and epistemic vices
Objectivity is commonly perceived as an epistemic virtue that has a legitimizing func-
tion. As Reiss and Sprenger (2013) put it: “To call a thing objective implies that it
has a certain importance to us and that we approve of it.” Given that objectivity has a
legitimizing function and is commonly associated with modern science, local knowl-
edge can easily become delegitimized by being characterized as lacking this essential
virtue (Aikenhead 2008). This problem of delegitimization is especially obvious in
philosophical accounts that tie objectivity to universalization. If the notion of objec-
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tivity is spelled out in terms philosophical conceptions such as Nagel’s (1989) “view
from nowhere” orWilliams’ (1985) “absolute conception”, knowledge cannot be both
local and objective in a substantial sense.
One can respond to this challenge by rejecting accounts of objectivity that rely on
universalization and by endorsing alternative proposals that leave room for local per-
spectives. And indeed, the compatibility of objectivity and contingent perspectives is
commonly addressed in recent debates about objectivity in both history and philosophy
of science (e.g. Daston and Galison 2008; Kukla 2006). Furthermore, feminist stand-
point theory (e.g. Intemann 2010; Crasnow 2013; Harding 2015) goes a step further by
arguing for more than just compatibility of locality and objectivity. Instead, standpoint
theorists stress that the locality of standpoints actually contributes to a “strong objec-
tivity” (Harding 1995) that makes the recognition of biases in mainstream research
possible.
While it is tempting to overcome the contrast between locality and objectivity with
an inclusive interpretation of objectivity, there remain problems with the ambiguity of
the concept of objectivity (e.g. Daston and Galison 2008; Freedman 2009; Douglas
2004). No matter whether locality and objectivity are presented as competitors or
complements, each account has to rely on a controversial specification of the concept
of objectivity before being able to address questions of locality. In a recent article,
Hacking (2015) provides a radical solution for this problem by urging us to simply
“stop talking about objectivity”. Hacking’s eliminativist proposal is not motivated
by an opposing subjectivist doctrine but by the assumption that “objectivity” is an
ambiguous and confusing “elevator word.”Giving up the notion of objectivity does not
imply that we give up important epistemological issues that are often associated with
objectivity talk. For example, it is certainly important to consider biases in research
or to discuss conflicts of interests. However, Hacking stresses that we can discuss
these “ground level questions” without invoking the elevator word “objectivity”. More
specifically, Hacking suggests that objectivity talk does not indicate the presence of a
specific virtue but can be understood as the “proclaimed absence of this or that vice”
(2015, p. 26).
To clarify this proposal, Hacking provides the case study of the sudden decline of
Sockeye Salmon in the Fraser River in Canada. While Sockeye Salmons traditionally
travel upstream from the Pacific Ocean, the annual run did not occur in 2009. Given
the contested nature of the phenomenon that affected various stakeholders such as
conservation biologists, First Nations, and salmon farmers, it is not surprising that the
objectivity of some of the involved research became discussed in a quickly established
commission. However, Hacking argues that a closer look at instances of objectivity
talk in this commission reveals that they were rhetorical maneuvers to indicate the
absence of epistemic vices. For example, Hacking quotes the salmon farmers associa-
tion that relied on an expert and argued that “Dr. Noakes’ demonstrates his objectivity
in his more thorough analysis of the escapes issue which included consideration of
escapees as potential vectors for disease” (Hacking 2015, p. 31). As Hacking points
out, objectivity talk is used here to indicate the absence of vices such as sloppy analysis
or conflict of interest. We do not lose anything by substituting “objectivity” with a
more specific discussion of these ground level questions.
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Hacking’s suggestion to replace ambiguous objectivity talk with more specific
discussions of epistemic vices appears attractive in debates about local knowledge.
Instead of engaging in scholastic debates about the question whether local knowledge
can be objective at all, we can focus on the question whether epistemic practices (local
or otherwise) suffer from certain vices. While this suggestion seems attractive in the
sense that it levels the playing field, it fails to capture an asymmetry that is of crucial
importance for understanding the reality of debates about local knowledge.
Hacking’s suggestion works just fine if we consider examples from scientific prac-
tice such as experts in the Sockeye Commission. If a scientist like Dr. Noakes can
make the case that his research is not influenced by vices such as conflicts of interests,
other members of the commission will take his results seriously. Unfortunately, this
will not work for all stakeholders in the Sockeye affair. Most obviously, the knowl-
edge systems of First Nations are often received with scepticism byWestern scientists.
This scepticism is usually not motivated by the assumption of a specific vice such as
a conflict of interest but rather by the general assumption that First Nations lack the
epistemic resources to explain complex ecological phenomena that are investigated
by scientists. Limiting a conversation to “the proclaimed absence of this or that vice”
(Hacking 2015, p. 26) often turns out to be a privilege because it presupposes that
practices have the necessary epistemic potential as long as they are not distorted by
vices.
To substantiate this worry with a real-life example, consider a different Canadian
committee thatwas established to evaluate the population decline of a different species.
TheRubyRangeSheepSteeringCommittee (RRSSC)was established in 1995 after the
Kluane First Nation expressed concerns about the declining numbers of Dall Sheep in
the nearbymountain ranges in the southWest Yukon. The case of Dall Sheep resembles
Hacking’s example of Sockeye Salmon in the sense that a committee was established
to tackle an issue that affected diverse stakeholders. For example, Dall Sheep have
been an important part of the diet of the Kluane for more than 2000 years but they are
also trophy animals that provide a substantial source of income for big game outfitters
as well as the local government. Nadasdy (2003) provides a detailed account of the
RRSSC and describes the attempts to integrate Indigenous and Western biological
knowledge as an utter failure. While all participants in the committee agreed that the
Dall Sheep population had declined, they endorsed vastly different accounts of the
causes as well as potential solutions. The Kluane interpreted the population decline as
a long-term and catastrophic phenomenon that required a complete (albeit temporal)
hunting ban for all involved parties. Biologists in the committee considered the decline
less worrying and assumed that it wasmostly a temporal phenomenon due to unusually
harsh winters.
As Nadasdy explains, the opposing judgments of different members of RRSSC
reflected both different data and uses of the data in reasoning about the problem.
Kluane elders and hunters relied on their personal experiences in interacting with Dall
Sheep over an extended period of time in a geographic range that went beyond the
Ruby Range. Elders had experience with Dall Sheep dating back to the 1920s and also
included historical information that was handed down in the community for several
generations. In contrast, biologists restricted themselves to data that was available
within the Ruby Range since the first systematic survey in the 1970s. The different
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judgments, however, were not only the consequence of different data. Kluane Elders
were deeply sceptical of the claim that temporary weather conditions were the main
cause of the population decline and suggested that this assumption was based on a
superficial understanding of the land and the Dall Sheep. “They referred to the many
years that they and/or their parents and grandparents had hunted in the area, claiming
that this wealth of experience gave them knowledge of the sheep that far surpassed any
that might be gained from a dozen or so annual surveys from a helicopter” (Nadasdy
2003, p. 191). Furthermore, the explanation was also rejected as ignoring or even
disrespecting the sheep who are used to the harsh winters of the Yukon and implying
that the sheep “were too ‘stupid’ to take care of themselves in their own home territory”
(Nadasdy 2003, p. 177).
The scepticism was returned by biologists who ended up ignoring most of the
arguments of the Kluane in their work for the RRSSC. In some cases, the evidence
that was provided by Kluane elders and hunters did not fit in the geographical or
temporal focus of the Rugy Range since the 1970’s and was therefore discarded.
However, there were deeper worries about the nature of the provided evidence that
was based on personal experience. For example, Nadasdy remarks that a “biologist told
me that he had misgivings about integrating TEK [Traditional Ecological Knowledge]
and [scientific] knowledge because of the ‘subjective’ nature of TEK. He said that it
was ‘too fluid and dependent upon individuals’ to be integrated with science”. (2003,
p. 195).
My aim here is not to evaluate the competing accounts of the population decline
but simply to point out that talking about the “proclaimed absence of this or that vice”
can be a privilege. The involved biologists could indeed follow Hacking’s suggestion
of focusing on epistemic vices such potential bias from the commercial interests of
big game outfitters. In this context, questions of objectivity may appear as a hollow
philosophical enterprise that does not add anything to the actually important questions
in scientific practice. However, this is a privilege based on the institutional organization
of the RSSCC in which the biologists had the power to decide what qualified as
knowledge and “never really had to question their assumptions about the nature of
research as a knowledge-producing activity” (Nadasdy 2003, p. 216). The situation
was different for representatives of First Nations who were trying to make their voices
heard: “Elders and hunters [...], however, told me they felt that the biologists were
treating them ‘like children’ and ignoring what they had to say” (Nadasdy 2003, p.
212).
This asymmetry illustrates that sticking to questions about epistemic vices is often
not enough. Indeed, Kluane elders and hunters could discuss potential vices of their
own accounts. Is an account based on sufficient personal experience with the sheep
populations? Is it influenced by biases such as personal gain from certain regulations?
Does it take observations from other hunters sufficiently into account? And so on.
Negative responses to these questionswould provide reasons to reject a certain account
but this was obviously not the problem in the case of the RRSSC. Even without any
of these vices, the First Nation elders and hunters were not taken seriously because
their epistemic practices were perceived as lacking the necessary virtues for producing
objective knowledge about the status of the Dall Sheep population.
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Indigenous knowledge holders can often not afford to limit themselves to a dis-
cussion of “this or that vice” as their epistemic practices are challenged at a more
fundamental level. In the following section, I will therefore consider two virtues that
are commonly associated with objectivity and argue that ethnobiology can often make
convincing cases for both virtues in local epistemic practices. In Sect. 3, I will return
to Hacking’s proposal and suggest that we should often replace general objectivity
talk with a nuanced discussion of both epistemic virtues and vices.
2 Local knowledge as objective knowledge
Doubts about the objectivity of local knowledge usually do not focus on epistemic
agents but on the practices they engage in. For example, the dismissal of First Nation
elders and hunters in the Dall Sheep case did presumably not stem from the suspicion
that they were less sincere than Western biologists about finding the causes of the
population decline. Instead, RRSSC members suspected that even the most sincere
and impartial Kluane would fail to gain reliable knowledge because their epistemic
practices are “too subjective”. Following Douglas’ (2004) useful taxonomy of dif-
ferent notions of objectivity, it seems that the objectivity of processes of knowledge
production (Douglas’ objectivity1) is at stake and not the objectivity of individuals
(objectivity2) or groups (objectivity3) who engage in these processes. As Douglas
points out, the objectivity of processes of knowledge production has been tradition-
ally associated with gaining “a grasp of the real objects in the world” (2004, p. 456).
And indeed, this seems to reflect worries that are commonly articulated against local
knowledge. For example, the charge against Kluane in the Dall Sheep case was that
their accounts simply failed to grasp what was really going on. Kluane (both as indi-
viduals and as a group) may have been sincere in wanting to identify the real causes
of the population decline but their epistemic practices led them astray.
Moving from slogans like “grasp of the real objects in the world” to metaphysically
less demanding formulations, Douglas suggests to distinguish between two senses
of the objectivity of processes. On the one hand, there is convergent objectivity that
reflects the convergence of results from different areas of inquiry. As Douglas points
out, convergent objectivity is not only for scientists: “In everyday life, when an object
continues to appear from a variety of vantage points and using a variety of tech-
niques (e.g., both sight and sound), the possibility of illusion seems remote. As any
birdwatcher will tell you, a convergence of evidence from various sources (e.g., bird
coloration and song) assists greatly in the objective identification of the species under
observation” (2004, p. 458). On the other hand, there is manipulable objectivity that
reflects reliable ways of intervening in the world. Again, Douglas argues that manip-
ulable objectivity is not limited to the sciences: “When we can use objects around us,
we trust our accounts of their existence and properties as reliable. If I can reach out
and drink from the glass of water, and it quenches my thirst, and I can fill it back up
again, repeating the whole process reliably, I have good reason to trust the reliability
of relevant beliefs about the glass” (2004, p. 457).
Both senses of objectivity specify virtues and not only the absence of vices in
the sense of Hacking. It is therefore attractive to frame debates about the objectiv-
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ity of Indigenous and other local knowledges in terms of the question whether they
exhibit the virtues of convergent and manipulable objectivity. And indeed, issues
of convergence have played an outstandingly important role in early ethnobiology.
To illustrate this historical connection, consider Diamond’s 1966 article “Zoological
Classification System of a Primitive People” that investigated correlations between
vertebrate categories (ámana aké) of the Fore of the New Guinea Highlands and
taxa in biological systematics. Diamond did not only find convergence but imme-
diately tied it to the objectivity of the categories employed: “The nearly one-to-one
correspondence between Fore ámana aké and species as recognized by European tax-
onomists reflects the objective reality of the gaps separating sympatric species” (1966,
p. 1102).
Diamond’s article is only one of countless examples of early “intellectualist” eth-
nobiology that focused on cross-cultural taxonomic convergence (Hunn 2007). Early
ethnobiologists not only collected data on taxonomic convergence in different geo-
graphic regions but also developed quantitative measures of convergence degrees
(Hunn 1975) and general frameworks of supposedly universal rules in folk-biological
classification (see Berlin 1992). This convergence research of early ethnobiologists
not only constitutes a fascinating (and severely understudied—see Ludwig 2015a)
case study for history and philosophy of science but seems to provide an illustration of
Douglas’ notion of convergent objectivity. If Indigenous and Western biologists come
to recognize the same species independently from each other, we have an excellent
example of how reaching the same result from different directions can indicate its
objectivity.
While studies of cross-cultural taxonomic convergence may illustrate convergent
objectivity, they arguably do not provide sufficient tools for a discussion of the objec-
tivity of local knowledge. In fact, one may argue that these studies do not provide an
account of local knowledge at all because they attempt to validate Indigenous knowl-
edge by showing that it is often not genuinely local but rather converges with Western
science. A substantial account of the objectivity of local knowledge should go beyond
these results and show that Indigenous knowledge can be objective even if it does
not converge with Western scientific knowledge. To address this issue, let us consider
three sources divergence that commonly lead to local knowledge in ethnobiology.
2.1 Goal-dependency of ontologies
One common source of divergence is that Indigenous andWestern scientific knowledge
rely onontologies that serve different epistemic and social goals. For example, consider
ethnopedological research on Indigenous knowledge about soil types. Indigenous and
Western pedological accounts of soil types typically converge to a certain degree as they
rely partly on similar (e.g.morphological) properties that lead to similar classifications.
While ethnopedological studies often correlate Indigenous andWestern classifications
of soil types, they also typically note substantial differences. To illustrate this, consider
recent research on soil classifications in the municipality of Hocabá in Yucatán that
are summarized in Fig. 1. The seven specific soil types that are identified by Estrada-
Medina et al. (2013) do not converge on soil types of theWorld Reference Base for Soil
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Fig. 1 Mayan soil types in Hocabá, Yucatán (Estrada-Medina et al. 2013, p. 9)
Resources (WRB). As Estrada-Medina et al. (2013, p. 8) put it: “Many soils identified
by farmers relate with more than oneWRB group of soil and vice versa; in these cases,
no direct relationship between both classification systems is possible.” For example,
Ch’ich’lu’um is classified as a Hyperskeletic Leptosol in the WRB but the two kinds
are not extensionally equivalent as the same is true for Ch’och’ol lu’um.
Thegoal-dependencyof ontologies (Danks2015; see alsoDupré1999;Chakravartty
2011; Ludwig 2015b) provides instructive examples of locality as it leads to knowledge
about entities such as Ch’ich’lu’um that have no extensional equivalent inWestern sci-
ence. This introduction of new entities reflects local epistemic and social aims. For
example, Hocabá soil classifications rely on properties such as soil depth, stoniness,
or drainage conditions (Bautista and Zinck 2010, p. 7) that are important for agricul-
tural practices of Maya communities. Knowledge that a soil is Ch’ich’lu’um and not
Ch’och’ol lu’um may be local in the sense that it involves entities that do not even
appear in Western taxonomies but it reflects regularities that are of crucial importance
for local epistemic and social practices.
How does this knowledge fare with Douglas’ notions of convergent objectivity and
manipulable objectivity? Convergence is limited through goal-dependency - agents
that are not interested in properties such as soil depth, stoniness, or drainage condi-
tionswill not recognize the same soil types and regularities asMaya in themunicipality
of Hocabá. However, this does not does undermine convergence between agents with
similar aims. And indeed, Bautista and Zinck (2010, p. 9) stress high levels of conver-
gence in soil knowledge among Yucatec Maya beyond Hocabá who share practices
such as “makingmilpa” (a traditional crop-growing system that produces beans,maize,
and squash).
While this convergence is limited to agents with similar aims, it would be unrea-
sonable to tie objectivity to external convergence between Indigenous and Western
researchers. Many results in Western science do not converge with results of Indige-
nous research but may still exhibit internal convergence when “disparate areas of
research all point towards the same result” (Douglas 2004, p. 458). Instead of dis-
cussing these results in terms of “internal convergence”, one could also frame them in
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terms of current debates about “robustness” in philosophy of science that rely on “the
idea of the invariance of a result under multiple independent determinations” (Soler
2012, p. 3; see alsoWimsatt 1981). The results of Indigenous andWestern researchers
may not converge on each other but still be robust in their respective target domains
if they are confirmed through multiple means of determination.
Considerations of internal convergence or robustness are also common in ethnobi-
ology as can be illustrated by a recent study (Prado et al. 2014) of knowledge about
the life habits and habitats of mammals among Brazilian quilombola communities.
While Prado et al. found high levels of internal agreement among the informants from
different quilombola communities regarding life habits, information about habitats of
some species such as the tayra (Eira barbara) lacked internal agreement. Prado et al.’s
interpretations fits the idea of internal convergence as they argue that “the low levels of
internal agreement and convergence” regarding habitats suggested a lack of knowledge
among quilombola communities (2014, p. 10). Their discussion can also be framed
in terms of robustness as confirmation through differentquilombola communities can
be seen as at least partly “independent determinations” of a result. This interpretation
also fits Wimsatt’s suggestion that detectors for robustness can “make intensive use of
intentional responses, such as questionnaires and various kinds of more passive survey
data” (Wimsatt 2012, p. 94). Arguably, this is exactly what is going on in Prado et al.’s
case where ethnobiological questionnaires suggested robustness regarding life habits
but not regarding habitats.
Apart from issues of internal convergence and robustness, a consideration ofmanip-
ulable objectivity also reinforces the impression that locality does not stand in the way
of epistemic reliability. Yucatec Maya knowledge about soil may be shaped by local
preferences and practices but it reflects empirically determined properties such as soil
depth, stoniness, or drainage conditions. Given these pragmatically crucial properties,
knowledge that a certain soil isCh’ich’lu’um certainly enables reliable ways of inter-
vening in the world in the sense of Douglas’ definition. In fact, one could hardly find
a more straightforward example of “manipulable objectivity” as Maya farmers have
been using their ethnopedological knowledge to “intervene in the world” for centuries
in daily practices such as making milpa.
2.2 Local domains of inquiry
While the goal-dependency of ontologies is a common source of divergence between
knowledge systems, there are other sources that have been carefully documented in
ethnobiology. For example, Indigenous communities tend to be interested in regular-
ities that occur within a specific environment while Western scientists often focus on
regularities that are stable across environments. Again, consider the case of soil types.
Ethnopedological knowledge among Yucatec Maya converges at least in part because
the entire Yucatán peninsula involves “repetition of four geomorphic systems all over
the area: coastal, karstic, tectono-karstic, and fluvio-paludal, each one showing specific
soil-relief patterns” (Bautista and Zinck 2010, p. 9). For Yucatec Maya, these patterns
matter and it is not relevant whether their taxonomy is also applicable in other regions
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beyond Yucatán. In contrast, Western pedologists often aim at uncovering regularities
that are stable across a range of different regions.
The observation that Indigenous knowledge often reflects locally occurring patterns
that tend to be ignored by Western scientists is widely acknowledged in ethnobiology
and often cited as one of the main reasons to incorporate local knowledge systems in
environmental management (Berkes and Folke 2002; Chalmers and Fabricius 2007;
Vandebroek 2011). Of course, a focus on locally occurring patterns sets limits to con-
vergence across environments. However, convergence is still possible between agents
who are concernedwith the same domain of inquiry. This type of geographically and/or
temporally restricted convergence is also common in Western ecological research
where scientists may come to convergent conclusions about ecological dynamics in
a specific research context. Furthermore, we can clearly apply Douglas’ account of
manipulable objectivity as knowledge about local patterns can provide tools for reli-
able interventions in a given domain of inquiry. In fact, attention to local patterns that
do not require generalization can lead to epistemically more fruitful strategies which
is reflected in the ethnobiological observation that local knowledge of Indigenous
communities can “often be superior to Western science in its ability to predict local
phenomena” (Pierotti 2010, p. 67).
2.3 Locality of methods
So far, I have discussed knowledge divergence that is caused by engagement with
different phenomena. Ethnobiological knowledge often diverges from Western bio-
logical knowledge because it is concerned with properties that are of unique relevance
for Indigenous practices or with patterns that occur only in a restricted domain of
inquiry. However, divergence can also occur in cases in which Indigenous and West-
ern biologists are concerned with the same phenomena in the same domain of inquiry
but employ different methods. To illustrate this, consider Marlor’s (2010) helpful
case study of Kwakwaka’wakw clam diggers and researchers of the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) on the West coast of Canada. Marlor documents dif-
ferent methods of DFO biologists and Kwakwaka’wakw clam diggers in assessing
the abundance of clams. The DFO survey “involved mapping the perimeters of the
area on a beach in which clams were expected or known to live, randomly selecting
a predetermined number of points within the perimeter to dig, digging up all clams
within a designated square area around the randomly selected point, and taking the
clams back to a lab to weigh, count and measure” (Marlor 2010, p. 518). In contrast,
Kwakwaka’wakw assessed clam abundance on the basis of the harvest outcome. Fur-
thermore, Marlor points out that this harvest involves complex tacit knowledge and is
most clearly embodied in old-time diggers who were able to “read” the beach well.
While DFO biologists and Kwakwaka’wakw did not disagree on clam abundance,
tensions still resulted from the biologists’ unwillingness to incorporate Kwak-
waka’wakw knowledge in the DFO surveys. Marlor argues that the main obstacle
for integration was the Kwakwaka’wakw use of methods that were not standardized
in a way that would allow replication by outsiders. I will return to the issue of repli-
cation in the next section, but it should be clear that lack of formal standardization
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does not undermine the possibility of convergent or manipulable objectivity. Tacit
knowledge in a community may not only lead to convergence but also to agreement
with communities that employ standardized methods. In fact, DFO biologists and
Kwakwaka’wakw largely converged in their assessment of clam abundance. But even
in cases of disagreement, standardized methods do not always imply higher trust-
worthiness. Marlor, for example, points out that butter clams tend to live adjacent to
rock walls that had to be excluded in a survey with straight perimeters. Of course,
this does not imply that the standardized assessments were less trustworthy than the
assessments of Kwakwaka’wakw. However, there is also no reason to assume that
standardized methods of Western scientists will always lead to more reliable assess-
ments and disagreements will have to be evaluated on a more detailed engagement
with the specifics of the individual case studies.
Beyond the issue of convergence, it should also be uncontroversial that the employ-
ment of tacit knowledge that is not formally standardized can meet criteria of
manipulable objectivity. Indeed, Kwakwaka’wakw knowledge about the abundance
of clams clearly enables reliable ways of intervening in the world as it has been used
for generations to support Kwakwaka’wakw clam digging.
Let us take stock. I presented three sources of locality that commonly lead to diver-
gence between Indigenous and Western scientific practices. First, I used the example
of soil types to show that divergence often reflects the goal-dependency of ontologies.
Second, I argued that divergence is also often the result of different domains of inquiry.
For example, Yucatec Maya are interested in patterns of the Yucatán peninsula while a
Western pedologist may be interested in broader patterns that occur across geographic
regions. Third, I suggested that different methodological standards can lead to diver-
gence as illustrated by the case of Kwakwaka’wakw clam diggers. While all three
sources of locality can lead to considerable differences between Indigenous andWest-
ern scientific knowledge, I have argued that none of them undermine the possibility
of objectivity along Douglas’ formulation of convergent and manipulable objectivity.
Of course, local Indigenous practices can fail to meet these criteria (Davis and Ruddle
2010) but this is true for all epistemic practices.
3 From objectivity to a diversity of virtues and vices
While Hacking’s proposal to replace objectivity talk with discussions of epistemic
vices is attractive, I have argued that it remains unsatisfying in many cases of local
knowledge. Hacking’s example of the Sockeye Commission is convincing if we only
focus on scientists who already agree on the norms of knowledge production. In
contrast, Indigenous knowledge holders often face not only doubts about Hacking’s
“absence of this or that vice” (2015, p. 26) but are challenged on a more general
level of basic epistemic virtues that are associated with objectivity. Furthermore, I
have argued that ethnobiological research illustrates that local knowledge often comes
with epistemic virtues such as (external or internal) convergence and manipulability.
Despite my argument that a discussion of epistemic vices is often not sufficient, I still
think that we can learn from Hacking’s suggestion to discuss “ground level questions”
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instead of “elevator words” such as “objectivity”. Indeed, it is helpful to distinguish
between two claims in Hacking’s proposal:
1. Objectivity talk is only about vices and not about virtues
2. Objectivity talk is ambiguous and it is usually better to discuss specific “ground
level questions”
My criticism has focused on (1). Not everyone can get away with only talking about
vices because not everyone has knowledge that is treated as having virtues necessary
to be taken seriously. However, this criticism is entirely compatible with Hacking’s
second suggestion that we are usually better off discussing ground level questions
instead of elevator words such as “objectivity”. In the following, I will argue that
Hacking’s framework is actually very convincing in ethnobiology if we include both
vices and virtues in our ground level discussions.
In the last section, I focused on two epistemic virtues that are commonly con-
sidered hallmarks of objectivity: convergence and manipulability. I have argued that
these virtues are by no means exclusive to Western science but also common in local
ethnobiological knowledge. This is an important result because it challenges not only
a common source of marginalization of local knowledge (Ludwig 2016) but also the
idea that local and Western scientific knowledge are separated by a clear method-
ological divide. In this sense, the results support Agrawal’s (1995, 2009, cf. Whyte
2013) influential arguments that the conceptual divide between Indigenous and scien-
tific knowledge obscures how “knowledge can be useful or useless, politically salient
or meaningless, socially relevant or irrelevant, empirically testable or irrefutable, and
ideologically open or blind, without reference to whether it is indigenous or scientific”
(Agrawal 2009, p. 157).
While attention to shared epistemic virtues is important, there is also a danger
of assimilating local ethnobiological knowledge to Western scientific knowledge in
a way that blurs epistemically and politically relevant differences. First, if we limit
ourselves to pointing out that local knowledgemeets standard criteria for objectivity, it
becomes unclearwhymany forms of local knowledge remainmarginalized in scientific
practice. Second, my discussion in the last section was asymmetric insofar as it only
considered whether local knowledge can have virtues that are commonly ascribed
to science. This perspective does not even touch the question what virtues may be
unique to local knowledge. As Hacking (2015, p. 27) points out, such as perspective
is “already loaded [...]; the objectivity of the sciences is not in question, but that of
aboriginals is.”
Following Hacking’s suggestion to discuss ground level questions, we can address
the epistemic virtues of different forms of knowledge without having to condense
them into one general notion of objectivity. First, this helps to tackle the question
why Indigenous and other local forms of knowledge often have a hard time being
taken seriously. To be sure, many forms of marginalization have little to do with
epistemic virtues and are more adequately explained in terms of political factors such
as the privilege of deciding what questions count as relevant. Recall that I argued
in the last section that ethnobiological knowledge is often local because it is shaped
by the demands of epistemic and social practices of specific contexts. For example,
ethnobiological knowledge may be concerned with properties that are important for
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a local community or focus on regularities that are only found in a restricted domain.
A scientist who does not share the interests of this community but has the privilege
to decide what issues count as significant may ignore Indigenous knowledge (Ludwig
2016; see Kitcher 2003 and Dupré 2015 for a more general discussion on what truths
count as “significant”).
Despite these political mechanisms that can lead to the marginalization of local
ethnobiological knowledge, there are also methodological issues that can be framed
in terms of epistemic virtues. For example, recall my discussion of the tension
between Kwakwaka’wakw clam diggers and DFO biologists. Marlor’s (2010) discus-
sion clearly shows that DFO biologists were reluctant to include Kwakwaka’wakw
knowledge because it failed to satisfy criteria of formal standardization. Is for-
mal standardization an epistemic virtue? One may argue that it is not a global
epistemic virtue as there are also other mechanisms of ensuring reliability of knowl-
edge. Kwakwaka’wakw knowledge about clams is clearly reliable in many ways but
reliability is achieved through other mechanisms such as personal training in col-
laboration with experienced clam diggers. Still, formal standardization is arguably
considered an important virtue in the context of modern scientific practices and, as
Marlor points out, linked to the value of transparency: “Specifically, I argue that
practices related to accountability create a structural barrier [...] scientists need to
legitimize their claims and advice to others by using acceptable, ‘replicable’ meth-
ods, peer review, and the publication of their reports to create the overall general
appearance of ‘transparency.’ The result is that practitioners who employ alterna-
tive ways of knowing, such as Indigenous peoples [...] are often dismissed” (2010,
p. 514).
Talking about a diversity of epistemic virtues instead of a general notion of objectiv-
ity is clearly helpful in providing a nuanced picture. While ethnobiological knowledge
often shares virtues such as convergence and manipulability with Western scientific
knowledge, it usually lacks other virtues such as formal standardization and trans-
parency that are considered crucial in institutionalized scientific practice. Furthermore,
a fine-grained discussion that moves beyond a general discussion of objectivity also
allows to address epistemic virtues that are unique to local practices. I have argued
that ethnobiological knowledge is often local in the sense that it is concerned with
phenomena that are of outstanding importance for the practices of Indigenous com-
munities but widely ignored in scientific contexts. In Sect. 2, I specified this locality
with three common sources of divergence that lead to the recognition of different
properties, regularities, and patterns.
The idea that local knowledge has the epistemic virtue of exposing blind spots of
a homogeneous scientific community is not new but well-known from debates about
Harding’s (1995) concept of “strong objectivity” and standpoint theory more gener-
ally (e.g. Wylie 2003). Standpoint theorists point out that marginalized accounts are
often capable to detect biases in scientific research. For example, an Indigenous com-
munity may help to identify shortcomings of a biological model that does not pay
sufficient attention to the peculiarities of a local ecosystem. However, ethnobiological
knowledge does not only have the function of exposing vices in Western perspectives
but has primarily the virtue of supporting practices of local communities. Ethnobi-
ological knowledge systems are misunderstood if they are only (or primarily) seen
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as correctives for Western science as they are adapted to support local epistemic and
social practices. As such, local ethnobiological knowledge has the virtue of reflecting
the needs of particular communities and therefore constitutes what Whyte (forth-
coming) has recently called a “governance value” that enables “Indigenous peoples’
self-determination”.
4 Conclusion
Debates about the status of Indigenous knowledge often get caught in an unhelpful
dichotomy of universalism and relativism. Universalism has a long tradition in ethno-
biologywith researchers postulating universal taxonomic structures and stressing “that
the ethnobiological knowledge of traditional peoples conforms in many respects to
basic scientific principles” (Berlin and Berlin 1996, p. 3; see also Berlin 1992). While
this universalist tradition has led to important research results, it seems to take Indige-
nous knowledge seriously only because (and insofar) as it resemblesWestern scientific
knowledge. As such, it does not provide an account of knowledge that is local in a
more substantive sense that requires divergence from scientific knowledge (Ludwig
2016). In contrast with this universalist approach, relativist approaches in anthropol-
ogy have also strongly influenced ethnobiological practice and clearly leave more
room for divergence between Indigenous and modern scientific knowledge systems.
However, this incorporation of divergence comes at the price of rejecting substantive
notions of objectivity.
While universalist and relativist models undermine substantive notions of either
locality or objectivity, I have argued that ethnobiological knowledge is often local in
the sense that it diverges from scientific knowledge but still satisfies standard criteria
for objectivity that have been proposed in philosophy of science. More specifically,
I have identified three common sources of locality. Ethnobiological knowledge (a)
relies on ontologies that are shaped by the requirements of local goals, (b) reflects
regularities and patterns are often only stable in restricted environments, and (c) uses
methods that avoid formal standardization. However, none of these features stand
in the way of manipulable or convergent objectivity as they have been proposed by
Douglas (2004). In this sense, my discussion of ethnobiology complements recent
attempts to introduce Indigenous perspectives to philosophy of science and to stress
their epistemic reliability and “objectivity” (Harding 2015; Koskinen 2015; Wylie
2015).
Characterizing Indigenous knowledge as “objective” is often not only epistemi-
cally but strategically justified. Given that the supposed lack of objectivity plays an
important role in themarginalization of Indigenous perspectives, it is often rhetorically
important to point out that standard criteria for objectivity are not exclusively met by
Western science. Still, general discussions of objectivity can also blur important differ-
ences and I have suggested that it is usually more helpful to focus of diverse epistemic
virtues and vices. Stressing the “objectivity of Indigenous knowledge” may be strate-
gically beneficial but can also have the opposite effect of taking Indigenous knowledge
seriously only insofar as it meets standards of Western science. As Nadasdy (2005)
and other anthropologists have warned, enthusiasm about the integration of Indige-
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nous andWestern science has often led to the exclusion of knowledge that is not useful
to Western scientists. Shifting the perspective from a general notion of objectivity to
diverse epistemic virtues therefore often provides a more adequate picture. On the one
hand, Indigenous andWestern perspectives often have virtues in common as illustrated
by Douglas’ notions of convergent and manipulable objectivity. On the other hand,
it is also of crucial importance to recognize that different knowledge systems have
different virtues and are often adapted to meet epistemic and social goals of specific
communities.
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